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 metaphoric meaning that results in a stable interpretation: (i) degree of meta­
phoricity and (ii) degree of metaphoric saturation. A majority of metaphoric utter­
ances in a corpus study (66%) were unsaturated, low metaphoricity utterances 
that behave as expected by Max Black and the cognitive linguistics paradigm. 
However, a significant minority (34%) of the metaphoric utterances were satu­
rated or high metaphoricity utterances that behave partially as expected by 
 Donald Davidson and others working in his tradition. This suggests that the di­
rect and indirect interpretation views of metaphor are not incompatible but apply 
to different sub­groups of metaphoric utterances. The paper then constructs a 
model of metaphoric meaning that makes falsifiable predictions about the inter­
pretations of metaphoric utterances in order to provide further evidence that 
 unsaturated, low metaphoricity utterances have stable interpretations. This re­
search provides both converging evidence for the cognitive linguistic view of 
metaphor and also a framework for limiting its scope to most, but not all, meta­
phoric utterances.
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1 The meaning of metaphors
Do metaphors have a consistent, direct meaning; or, is there such a thing as met­
aphoric meaning? If metaphors do have meaning, can that meaning be modeled 
in such a way that predictions can be made and tested about (i) which utterances 
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are metaphoric (identification)1 and (ii) what these metaphoric utterances mean 
(interpretation)?
There have been two sorts of answers to this question. On the one side, exem­
plified by Max Black, are those who say that metaphors do have a meaning, that 
this meaning is not simply an embellished or dressed up version of a literal 
 paraphrase, and that users of a language follow certain rules in the creation and 
interpretation of novel metaphors (Black 1962, 1977).2 Instances of theories of 
metaphor developed using Black’s archetype include Conceptual Metaphor 
 Theory (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1999), which claims that metaphors have a di­
rect meaning, that cognitive principles constrain the sorts of metaphors which 
are frequently used, and that the conceptual metaphors underlying metaphoric 
expressions can be modeled and their interpretations and inferences predicted 
(Narayanan 1999; Barnden 2001; Lee and Barnden 2001).
On the other side, exemplified by Donald Davidson (1978), are those who say 
that metaphors have a literal meaning, which is clearly absurd or false or trivial, 
and nothing else. Metaphor interpretation is a creative act, little bound by rules, 
and metaphors are subject to new interpretations with every new interpreter. 
What consistent meanings do exist are, perhaps, a result of inference. For exam­
ple, in Martinich’s (1984) approach, the final interpretation of the metaphor 
comes after the interpreter realizes that the literal meaning is absurd or false or 
trivial and, using Grice’s maxims, discovers what is meant by the absurd or false 
or trivial statement as used in that particular situation. Metaphor cannot be 
 modeled, in this view, because the final interpretation of the metaphor will de­
pend entirely upon the wider context (Coulson and Matlock 2001, provide a brief 
juxtaposition of these two positions, together with evidence against Martinich’s 
position).
The point of this paper is to show that both sides are partly wrong. The focus 
within cognitive linguistics on metaphors as cognitive mappings and blendings 
has disguised the amount of influence that the properties of metaphoric utter­
ances have on whether the metaphoric expression has a consistent meaning ca­
pable of being modeled or whether it has an indirect interpretation that cannot be 
1 Identification does not necessarily mean that native speakers can distinguish between 
metaphoric and non-metaphoric utterances. Rather, it refers to the requirement that a model of 
metaphor be able to identify metaphoric and non-metaphoric utterances in order to be explicit 
about its scope.
2 This is not the traditional narrative given within cognitive linguistics (e.g., Grady 2007) which 
usually starts with Lakoff & Johnson (1980). However, it seems to me at least that Black must be 
credited with many of the fundamental ideas involved. Thus, I am using Black’s formulation of 
the position.
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modeled. In other words, there is more to modeling metaphoric meaning than 
just cognitive mappings and blendings.
This paper has two parts. The first part, Section 2, examines Davidson’s 
 arguments against metaphoric meaning and introduces two properties of meta­
phoric utterances that can help us understand his arguments: the degree of 
 metaphoricity and the degree of saturation of metaphoric utterances. These 
two properties influence whether an utterance can be consistently interpreted, 
regardless of the underlying conceptual metaphor. A corpus study shows that 
most metaphoric utterances (66%) behave as we expect under the cognitive lin­
guistics paradigm. There are, however, a surprisingly high number (34%) of 
 metaphoric utterances which do not necessarily behave this way. This part of the 
paper uncovers a number of problems with the standard approaches within cog­
nitive linguistics that encourage the arguments that Davidson and others have 
made.
The second part of the paper, Section 3, builds a model and methodology for 
showing that, for the majority of metaphoric utterances, a prediction­making, 
 falsifiable model of metaphoric meaning is possible. The point of this part of the 
paper is to provide a new source of evidence supporting the view of metaphor 
held by Black and the cognitive linguistics paradigm, evidence which is neces­
sary in light of the success of arguments by Davidson for a significant number of 
metaphoric utterances.
This research has two significances for metaphor research within cognitive 
linguistics. First, it shows the importance of attention to linguistic form in addi­
tion to cognitive mappings and blendings. In other words, the structure of the 
utterance makes a difference. For example, Falck and Gibbs (2012: 258) point out 
that:
Cognitive linguistic research on metaphor has not generally focused sufficiently on the 
role  of linguistic meaning in the creation and continued use of metaphorical concepts, 
 because of its strong emphasis on the experiential grounding of linguistic structure and 
behavior.
The linguistic structure of metaphoric utterances discussed here is one source 
of the linguistic meaning that can eventually influence metaphoric concepts, sug­
gesting a mutual dependence. Second, this research protects work on metaphor 
within cognitive linguistics from the sorts of arguments used by proponents of 
philosophical and formal semantics to dismiss linguistic research on metaphor. 
This is important because while Kértesz and Rákosi (2009) and Ruiz de Mendoza 
and Perez Hernandez (2011) defend approaches to metaphor within cognitive 
 linguistics against criticisms of their internal theoretical constructs, they do not 
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consider criticisms of their premises (that metaphoric utterances have a stable 
meaning)3 or their scope (that all metaphoric utterances fall under the theory’s 
description).
2  The influence of linguistic structure on 
metaphoric meaning
2.1  Arguments against metaphoric meaning
Davidson (1978: 31) begins by saying that:
Metaphor is the dreamwork of language and . . . its interpretation reflects as much on the 
interpreter as on the originator. . . . So too understanding a metaphor is as much a creative 
endeavor as making a metaphor, and as little guided by rules.4
Another way of putting this is that users of a language lack a competence for 
 consistently interpreting metaphoric utterances (whether that competence is lin­
guistic or otherwise) because there is no such thing as metaphoric meaning to be 
interpreted. Metaphors have only an absurd or false literal meaning which re­
quires that each act of interpretation be independent and unique, a creative act 
of making meaning where no meaning existed before.5 Interpretation is a sort of 
production.
In the following paragraph he adds, “there is no manual for determining 
what a metaphor ‘means’ or ‘says.’ ” (Davidson 1978: 31). He goes even further in 
the first footnote by disagreeing with Black’s (1962: 29) statement that the rules of 
3 This is a premise of CMT in the sense that conceptual metaphors and domain mappings and 
embodied experience are used to explain how metaphors have this stable meaning.
4 This sort of interpretive-creativity is very different from the productive-creativity in Kövecses 
(2010). In fact, the two are inversely related in the sense that if Davidson is right about the 
proliferation of interpretive-creativity then productive-creativity is not particularly useful: 
no one will be capable of understanding the results of that productive-creativity.
5 Grady (2007: 196) argues briefly that Davidson sees possible metaphoric connections as 
unconstrained, with no limits on what conceptual metaphors are possible, and that he “goes 
so far as to claim that metaphors have no meaning.” Grady has the order of these positions 
backward: Davidson sees metaphors as utterances without a direct (non-inferential) meaning, 
and from this it follows that certain metaphoric meanings cannot be preferred over others. 
Grady also overlooks the fact that Davidson is right about many metaphors, which do not have 
a stable interpretation and in this way seem unconstrained.
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language determine what must count as a metaphoric utterance.6 For Davidson, 
there is no consistent way to identify metaphoric utterances because there are 
no properties that separate them from other false or absurd utterances. This rep­
resents the skeptical position about metaphors, and figurative language more 
broadly, that they have neither a systematic meaning nor a systematic character 
of any kind. He argues, rather, that metaphoric utterances do not exist as such.
Davidson’s main thesis is that metaphoric utterances do not have some spe­
cial metaphoric meaning but only their literal meaning. His argument is that 
 although the interpreters of the metaphoric utterance do receive some sort of 
“meaning” from the utterance containing the metaphor, this meaning is not pres­
ent in the utterance itself (somehow encoded or secreted inside it) but rather is 
present only in the interpreter. Thus, with each situation and each creative inter­
preter, the metaphor can have a different “meaning.” Metaphor is entirely in the 
eye of the beholder. The reason it is so difficult to interpret even the simplest 
metaphors is that metaphors do not have a meaning to be interpreted. The evi­
dence that metaphors do not have a stable meaning, then, is that we know no 
easy or straightforward way to get at that meaning. If it existed, we would have 
found it (for a practical counter­argument, see Section 3).
Davidson is partly right and partly wrong. Davidson’s argument goes wrong 
because it turns out that metaphoric utterances come in many different shapes 
and sizes. While I see merit in Black’s original reply (1979) to Davidson, one of its 
weaknesses is that he does not admit that Davidson’s argument does, in fact, 
work for some cases: metaphors which lack a direct meaning (what Davidson 
calls a literal meaning) and, as a result, trigger a series of inferences no different 
from those present in non­metaphoric utterances which fail to meet the conversa­
tional maxims. However, metaphors like this are a minority of metaphoric utter­
ances. They are not representative of the sorts of metaphors actually used in texts 
and they are by no means numerically the most frequent (see corpus study be­
low). In other words, Davidson incorrectly generalizes a valid argument about a 
small sub­set of metaphors to all metaphors. Most metaphors have a stable inter­
pretation derived from a direct meaning or, as Black says, “to be able to produce 
and understand metaphorical statements is nothing much to boast about” (Black 
1979: 131).
In making this argument, I am not engaging directly with the debate about 
whether metaphor has meaning as something which is said directly and “directly 
6 Black’s position is more nuanced than Davidson’s representation of it, however. Later in the 
same paragraph which is quoted by Davidson, Black writes, “This is an example . . . of how 
recognition and interpretation of a metaphor may require attention to the particular 
circumstances of its utterance.” (Black 1962: 29).
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expresses a proposition, which can potentially be evaluated as either true or 
false” (Bezuidenhout 2001: 156; also, Wearing 2006), or whether metaphor has 
meaning as constructed by the hearer based on inferences or pragmatic princi­
ples and “not expressed by the words themselves” (Reimer 2001: 152; also, 
 Martinich 1984; Black 1979: 138 puts Davidson in this category). This debate is 
somewhat simplistic because metaphoric utterances are not all one or the other: 
metaphoric utterances can have either direct meanings or indirect interpreta­
tions. Metaphors are no different in this respect than non­metaphors. The debate 
between direct and indirect metaphoric meaning is misplaced because this is not 
an issue solely for metaphors but for all utterances. In short, the fact that an 
 utterance is metaphoric has no bearing on whether its meaning is directly or indi­
rectly interpreted, so that the two positions are not necessarily opposed (this dif­
fers from Coulson and Matlock 2001, who see the two positions as always in 
contrast).
2.2 Variations in metaphoricity
Linguistic properties cause some utterances to be more metaphoric than others 
(Dunn 2011; Coulson and Matlock 2001, among others, focus on non­linguistic 
causes of the same property). There are theoretical accounts elsewhere of why 
this is the case; for my purposes here I simply want to show that it is the case. 
Let’s look at some examples. In (1a), we see an entirely non­metaphoric utter­
ance. In (1b), the verb is changed to demolished, making the utterance mildly 
metaphoric. In (1c), the patient case role is also changed to John’s stronghold, 
making the utterance more metaphoric still. In (1d), the instrument case role is 
also changed to new found weapon; this utterance is more metaphoric than the 
others (it is also a saturated metaphoric utterance, as we will see shortly). My 
point here is that metaphoricity varies continuously, with some utterances being 
more and others less metaphoric (see also Evans 2010).
(1a)  Mary disproved John’s argument with her newly found evidence.
(1b)  Mary demolished John’s argument with her newly found evidence.
(1c)  Mary demolished John’s stronghold with her newly found evidence.
(1d)  Mary demolished John’s stronghold with her newly found weapon.
I would also like to observe that there is no clear dividing line between 
 non­metaphoric and metaphoric. Thus, while some utterances are clearly non­
metaphoric and others are clearly metaphoric, there is also a large third category 
which is ambiguous between the two (in other words, it is hard to tell if such ut­
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terances are metaphoric or not). Thus, in (2a) this description of a company’s 
profit report is clearly non­metaphoric. And, in (2b), this description of the same 
report is clearly a metaphoric utterance. However, the description in (2c) is not so 
clearly one or the other; rather, it seems to straddle the boundary between non­
metaphoric and metaphoric. This is an important point because to say that meta­
phoric utterances have only a literal meaning (a premise essential for Davidson’s 
argument) assumes that such a literal, non­metaphoric meaning is clear­cut and 
not problematic.
(2a)  Company profits continued to increase during the third quarter.
(2b)  Company profits soared to new heights during the third quarter.
(2c)  Company profits rose steadily during the third quarter.
2.3  Saturated and unsaturated metaphoric utterances
Metaphoric utterances can be divided into two categories, saturated and un­
saturated, based on their utterance­internal relations (Dunn 2011). The degree 
of  saturation depends upon how much of the utterance is filled with meta­
phoric material. Unsaturated utterances contain elements from both the source 
and the target domains. Saturated utterances, on the other hand, contain ele­
ments from only the target domain. This means that they could be either en­
tirely  non­metaphoric or entirely metaphoric depending only on the wider 
 context. Let’s consider the utterance in (3a), repeated from (1d) above. This 
 sentence is saturated and cannot be ambiguous between metaphoric and non­
metaphoric, but rather can only be entirely metaphoric (when followed, for 
 example, by [3b]) or entirely non­ metaphoric (when followed, for example, by 
[3c]).
(3a)  Mary demolished John’s stronghold with her new found weapon.
(3b)  He had to agree that her theory was better formed.
(3c)  He had to flee and leave his material possessions behind.
Now let’s look at the low metaphoricity utterances from (1) above, both of 
which are unsaturated. These contain elements from both the source and tar­
get  domains. This means that the utterance is connected to both primary and 
secondary cognitive models (Evans 2010). Metaphorically speaking, there is a 
clash between these different models. To use a different metaphor, if we assume 
that natural language utterances have a semantic structure that consists, in part, 
of case role organization connecting an event with its arguments (Fillmore 1967), 
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and if we assume that the arguments of an event must meet certain selectional 
restrictions (Katz and Fodor 1963), then the utterances in (4a) and (4b) contain 
mismatched arguments.7 In other words, some of these case role fillers would 
not meet the selectional restrictions, because in non­metaphoric language argu­
ments are not physical objects capable of being demolished, and evidence is 
not a physical instrument capable of demolishing strongholds. Unsaturated ut­
terances like this can be identified as metaphoric in any context with reference 
only to their structure. This is because there is a mismatch or divergence be­
tween  the elements of the utterance, which come from both source and target 
domains.
(4a)  Mary demolished John’s argument with her newly found evidence.
(4b)  Mary demolished John’s stronghold with her newly found evidence.
We can see, then, that only saturated metaphoric utterances have the possi­
bility of having both a non­metaphoric and metaphoric meaning. To be clear, I am 
not arguing that saturated utterances are ambiguous between non­metaphoric 
and metaphoric because the lexical items involved are ambiguous between a 
non­metaphoric and a metaphoric meaning. Rather, I am saying that saturated 
utterances (and only saturated utterances) can be either non­metaphoric or 
 metaphoric as a whole based on their use in a particular context. This is impor­
tant because Davidson’s argument depends on the idea that metaphoric utter­
ances have a false or absurd literal or non­metaphoric meaning. Only saturated 
metaphoric utterances, however, have something that could be called a literal 
meaning.
2.4  Metaphors with no stable interpretation
The following examples come from the Corpus of Contemporary American Eng­
lish (Davies 2008; henceforth COCA). The utterance in (5) has high metaphoricity 
(in this case because of a highly metaphoric cross­domain mapping). The utter­
ance does not have a stable interpretation. The same is true for the utterance in 
(6). What does it mean to “invest brainpower in looks”? The interpretation re­
quires the creativity of each interpreter, as Davidson argues, and a range of inter­
pretations is possible.
7 These assumptions are not necessary for the empirical point being made; I am using this 
particular model here only because it clarifies the point in question.
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(5)  But as I have long maintained, poetry is something encoded on one’s soul, and 
it is a lucky few who are able to decipher it during their lifetime.
(6)  A lady on high heels clacked along, the type my mother says invests all of her 
brainpower in her looks.
In (7) the utterance again has high metaphoricity and lacks a single inter­
pretation. Does Lorrain herself use different disguises or does she read through 
different disguises? Does she often return to old disguises? The interpretation 
is  not fixed. Likewise, in (8) the interpretation is not clear and the inter­
preter must use something like Martinich’s (1984) approach to make sense of the 
utterance.
(7)  The proliferating disguises and pen names through which Lorrain would con-
stantly migrate attest to a need for self-fictionalization experienced as travel 
and change.
(8)  The seasons have married into this gumbo culture that’s something that people 
love to come visit.
Similarly, the metaphoric utterances in (9), (10), and (11) have high meta­
phoricity. The utterances lack a consistent or stable interpretation and in this 
way show evidence that metaphor is sometimes the “dreamwork of language.” 
How does the Bible create a world by imagining it? What does that mean? In 
what  way does the writer offend beauty by writing about it? Does offending 
the hand involve injuring the hand? Or simply being inconvenient (this is also 
metonymy)?
(9)  I don’t think the Bible describes our world; the Bible imagines it, and by imag-
ining it creates a world drenched with grace from God.
(10)  Beauty, by its nature, is agreement. I want to offend beauty by writing about 
it.
(11)  Their hatchback lets you easily load. Their interiors fit together well and  offend 
neither eye nor hand.
I will turn now to saturated utterances. The utterance in (12) below is satu­
rated in the sense that all of its structure is filled with material compatible 
with  the  metaphor: we cannot tell if Jack Kemp is being removed from a list 
or,  perhaps, killed. The first could be non­metaphoric, but the second would 
be  metaphoric. Thus, this could be a non­metaphoric sentence or, in the con­
text of (12a), could be used to refer to murder and have high metaphoricity. Simi­
larly, the utterance in (13) could be either a saturated and high metaphoricity 
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 utterance discussing someone’s performance in school (it is), or it could be a non­
metaphoric discussion of someone’s performance during a race. Thus, there is 
again no stable interpretation that does not depend upon the larger discourse 
context.
(12)  Well, this week we subtracted Jack Kemp, which is really kind of unfortunate.
(12a)  We didn’t want to kill Jack.
(13)  At a meeting in early March, Crewe told them “the high bar we want you to 
jump now is the one you should have been jumping all along. The problem is 
that you’ve been trained to jump too low.”
Again, in (14) we do not know if this is a metaphoric utterance, for example if 
it means that he can make otherwise sophisticated people leave an investment in 
a hurry and thus lose out on upcoming gains, or if it is a non­metaphoric utter­
ance about a practical joker. In (15) we do not know whether this is a metaphoric 
utterance in which people are emotionally invested or have invested time in los­
ing weight (and thus, why make changes when they will soon lose weight?) or 
whether it is a non­metaphoric utterance talking about financial profits (will 
making things easier for the overweight hurt gym memberships?).
(14)  He can make fools of his well-educated employers and even his billionaire 
 father-in-law: he can cause these otherwise sophisticated people to jump, and 
then laugh at them behind their backs.
(15)  Oakland-based Lyons consults with doctors and club owners who want to 
 create more welcoming environments for large women. But she admits it’s 
hard to change preconceptions, especially when so much is invested in weight 
loss.
This is evidence that both high metaphoricity and saturated metaphoric ut­
terances do not carry a stable or consistent interpretation. High metaphoricity 
utterances (like most metaphors) have only a metaphoric meaning; but that meta­
phoric meaning has many possible interpretations. Saturated utterances (and 
only saturated utterances) have the possibility of both a non­metaphoric and 
metaphoric meaning that Davidson takes for granted. As a result, the interpreter 
must decide whether to take the saturated utterance as metaphoric or non­ 
metaphoric, a process that may or may not take place in the way Martinich 
 describes.
Even though these two kinds of metaphoric utterances lack a stable interpre­
tation as Davidson argues, they behave differently (something not described by 
Davidson’s approach). Saturated utterances lack a consistent interpretation only 
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when viewed in a limited context, but high metaphoricity utterances lack a con­
sistent interpretation in all contexts.
2.4.1 Counter-examples
Does this mean that all high metaphoricity and saturated utterances lack a stable 
interpretation? Interestingly, no. The counter­example in (16a) below shows an 
utterance with many metaphoric constituents (and so high metaphoricity) which 
is still interpretable. If we remove in their relationship, as shown in (16b), the 
 result is an unsaturated utterance. In this case, the utterance now allows both a 
metaphoric and a non­metaphoric interpretation. One possible answer is that the 
version in (16a) uses conventionalized material, with the result that it does not 
actually have high metaphoricity. What happens if we exchange this material 
with less conventional manifestations of the same conceptual metaphor? The 
 version in (16c), based on the same cross­domain mappings but differing in the 
linguistic realization of those mappings, does not share the same stable interpre­
tation as (16a). This suggests, then, that linguistic structure, in addition to cross­
domain mappings, influences the interpretation of the metaphoric utterance.
(16a)  They were at a cross-roads in their relationship, so they decided to turn back 
on their tracks and find a better way to get where they wanted.8
(16b)  They were at a cross-roads, so they decided to turn back on their tracks and 
find a better way to get where they wanted.
(16c)  They were at a big intersection in their relationship, so they decided to 
do a U-turn and find a way to get where they wanted that had less speed 
bumps.
2.5  Metaphors with a stable interpretation
Metaphors contained in unsaturated or low metaphoricity utterances have a di­
rect meaning with a stable interpretation. By direct meaning, I intend to say that 
there is no false literal meaning because the only meaning is the metaphoric 
meaning. For example, the utterance in (17a) does not depend upon conversa­
tional implicatures nor upon the creative interpretation of the hearer for its mean­
ing. The hearer will not first construct a non­metaphoric meaning, reject that 
8 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this example.
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meaning, and use Grice’s maxims to construct a situational interpretation. This is 
because the utterance, although a metaphor, possesses what I am calling a direct 
meaning. The same is true for (17b) and for (17c) and for (17d). We could go on 
giving examples, but the point is that these and most metaphoric utterances, for 
whatever reason and from whatever source, do carry a stable interpretation for 
speakers of English.
(17a)  Mary demolished John’s argument with her newly found evidence.
(17b)  Company profits soared to new heights during the third quarter.
(17c)  Mary’s theory had a firm foundation.
(17d)  Her marriage was running out of fuel.
The situation, then, is that the properties of metaphoricity and saturation, 
together with properties of the underlying cross­domain mappings, determine 
whether a metaphoric utterance will have a direct meaning allowing a stable in­
terpretation (a direct meaning because there is no absurd or false literal meaning 
which must first be discarded) and be described by Black’s work and work within 
cognitive linguistics, or whether it will have only an indirect interpretation (indi­
rect because there is the possibility for a non­metaphoric meaning and so the in­
terpretation must be worked out by inference or because there are multiple meta­
phoric interpretations possible) and be described by Davidson’s work.
2.6  Corpus evidence: Frequency of saturation and 
metaphoricity
Which type of metaphor is more common? A corpus study was conducted to de­
termine the frequency of saturated and unsaturated metaphoric expressions and 
of low metaphoricity and high metaphoricity expressions in American English 
using COCA.
2.6.1 Methodology
The study first selected 20 verbs, 5 each from the general domains physical, 
mental, social, and abstract. Although some of the verbs could not be dis­
cretely categorized into only one domain, this approach was used to ensure a 
wide representation of metaphors. Some of the domains, such as mental, yield­
ed many fewer metaphoric expressions than others, such as physical. The do­
mains were equalized by choosing 25 tokens of each verb for a total of 125 tokens 
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of each domain and a total of 500 metaphoric expressions. A random sample of 
each word was drawn from COCA and metaphoric expressions were included in 
the study as they were encountered. The intuitions of the author were used to 
identify metaphoric vs. non­metaphoric expressions. The complete verb list can 
be found in Appendix 1.
The 500 metaphors in the study were randomly sorted and then annotated 
for two features: saturation and metaphoricity. Each feature was given two  values. 
For saturation, 0 was used for unsaturated and 1 for saturated expressions. For 
metaphoricity, 0 was used for low metaphoricity and 1 was used for high meta­
phoricity. A precise procedure for determining high metaphoricity does not cur­
rently exist (although see Dunn 2011 for work in that direction). The annotations 
erred on the side of inclusion in questionable cases.
2.6.2 Results
As shown in Table 1, only 13% of the metaphors were saturated. Only 21% were 
high metaphoricity. This means that, overall, 66% of the metaphors were neither 
saturated nor high metaphoricity and thus not subject to Davidson’s arguments 
(however, see Section 2.7 below for a discussion of methodological decisions that 
made the other 34% perhaps higher than it should be). On the one hand, this 
means that Davidson is mostly wrong. On the other hand, this means that David­
son is right about quite a few metaphors. The problem is that most theories of 
metaphor do not take these distinctions based on the linguistic structure of the 
metaphoric utterance into account, even though the two types of metaphors be­
have very differently.
There is something else to notice in these results: the prevalence of saturated 
utterances differs between domains. The difference between domains in satura­
tion was significant (at the p = .11 level); the difference between domains in meta­
phoricity was not significant (each using a chi­square test of frequencies). There 
was also a significant difference between the domains in terms of whether the 
metaphors have a consistent interpretation (e.g., between unsaturated, low 
Physical Mental Social Abstract Total
Saturated 34 [27%] 01 [00%] 09 [01%] 23 [18%] 67 [13%]
High metaphoricity 23 [18%] 17 [14%] 33 [26%] 33 [26%] 106 [21%]
Both 00 [00%] 00 [00%] 00 [00%] 02 [00%] 02 [00%]
Neither 68 [54%] 107 [86%] 83 [66%] 71 [57%] 330 [66%]
Table 1: Frequency of Metaphoricity and Saturation
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 metaphoricity utterances and all others; at the p = .01 level). I did not expect 
these significant differences to occur. Certainly, there were many more metaphors 
in the physical domain than in the mental domain, but in the results above 
there was a fixed number of tokens from each domain in order to overcome that 
disparity. I will present no explanation for this here, except that it suggests that 
not only are  the frequencies of metaphors constrained by cognitive mappings, 
but that those same mappings influence the presence of these linguistic proper­
ties of metaphoric utterances. This implies a mutual dependence.
2.7 Causes of saturation
There are a few properties of a metaphoric utterance that can cause it to be satu­
rated (I am using ‘cause’ in a loose sense because I mean that saturated utter­
ances have some or all of these other properties). First, referential ambiguity in 
one of the arguments can leave the verb open between non­metaphoric and meta­
phoric interpretations, as in (18a) below (this and the following examples are 
taken from COCA). This causes saturation in a corpus study that restricts its atten­
tion to smaller units of language, but in discourse these saturated metaphors will 
disappear (because the reference will not be ambiguous). The same is largely true 
of saturated metaphors caused by lexical ambiguity, as in (19a) below. Again, in a 
larger context (although not in the corpus study above) these ambiguities will 
likely be resolved and the saturation will disappear.
(18) Referential ambiguity
(18a)  I didn’t know what it was. It would not compute. It had a kind of clarity about 
it.
(19) Lexical ambiguity
(19a)  So – and they can’t throw the case out.
Unspecified arguments are a more persistent cause of saturation. In (20a) we 
can assume that what is jumping is the number of chapters and conferences. But 
it isn’t specified. The same is true in (20b), where the missing argument will deter­
mine whether or not the utterance is metaphoric.
(20) Unspecified arguments
(20a)  India, the number of members increased 18% and chapters and conferences 
also saw significant jumps.
(20b)  Mom butchered ours. There’s only two pictures left of Dad in all twelve 
 albums.
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Background knowledge or world knowledge can also cause saturation be­
cause the utterance itself is unspecified to some degree. For example, in (21a) the 
town is not legally owned. But, without background knowledge filling in this in­
formation, a non­metaphoric interpretation is possible.
(21) Background Knowledge
(21a)  It’s about a town bought and paid for and subverted by a gangster element.
2.8 Causes of high metaphoricity
Utterances that are high metaphoricity tend to have some or all of the following 
properties. The first is that these utterances have multiple metaphoric constitu­
ents (this also means that they lean toward saturation). For example, in (22a) 
there are several metaphoric constituents in the utterance (from different meta­
phors), which makes the utterance as a whole more metaphoric. While saturation 
tends to occur when an utterance is filled completely with a single metaphor, high 
metaphoricity results also when there are multiple metaphors in the utterance.
(22) Many metaphoric constituents
(22a)  Veterans of many an evening at the routine pursuit of duty in the field, their 
emotional sacs barnacled with cynicism and their minds programmed for 
sardonic wit, sprang to their feet.
The underlying metaphor can also give an utterance high metaphoricity 
(something frequently researched, for example with Black’s resonant metaphors, 
and in Coulson and Matlock’s 2001 study that involved a continuum between 
non­metaphoric and metaphoric, and in Evans’ LCCM Theory 2010). In (23a) it is, 
in part, the properties of the underlying metaphor which makes the utterance 
high metaphoricity. In (23b), similarly, the reverse of the more common conduit 
metaphor results in a high metaphoricity utterance. This is not so much a linguis­
tic property as a property of metaphor­in­thought.
(23) High metaphoricity connection
(23a)  I don’t marry myself to one belief system.
(23b)  Poetry is something encoded on one’s soul, and it is a lucky few who are able 
to decipher it during their lifetime.
The presence of grammatical metaphors can also result in high metaphoric­
ity. For example, in (24a) the utterance has higher metaphoricity than the 
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 constructed counterpart in (24b), although the only difference between them is 
the linguistic structure. Further, both are equally saturated. For this reason, it 
seems that unusual constructions (or argument structure) can increase metapho­
ricity. This fits with Lakoff’s view of grammar (1987) in which some constructions 
are metaphorical in themselves. In other words, high metaphoricity utterances 
can result when a metaphor is expressed using a metaphorical construction, 
compounding the presence of metaphor in the utterance.
(24)  Altered or unexpected argument structure
(24a)  My normal sensations flooded back, although I had to migrate my eyes to get 
them pointed forward.
(24b)  My normal sensations flooded back, as my eyes migrated forward again.
2.9 Applications to metonymy
Metonymic utterances can also be saturated, meaning that in isolation the utter­
ance is ambiguous between a metonymic and non­metonymic interpretation. For 
example, the utterance in (25a) could have either the interpretation in (25b) or 
that in (25c).
(25a)  The ham sandwich is getting cold.
(25b)  The man who ordered the ham sandwich asked to have the heat turned up.
(25c)  The ham sandwich that was prepared is getting cold and needs to be brought 
out.
Similarly, metonymic utterances vary in how strikingly metonymic they are. 
For example, some cases of metonymy have stronger metonymic links than 
 others. The examples in (25) are different metonymic sources to the same target. 
The example in (25a) points out the customer’s order, (25b) points out the cus­
tomer’s location, and (25c) points out a physical attribute of the customer. I will 
not speculate on the factors that influence the strength of these links here (but 
see Panther and Thornburg 1998).
(25a)  The ham sandwich wants his coffee now.
(25b)  Table 6 wants his coffee now.
(25c)  The red shirt wants his coffee now.
The argument that metaphors have only a literal meaning that is either 
false  or absurd and thus incapable of being false reaches further problematic 
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ground with metonymy: do these utterances have a literal meaning in addition 
to a metonymic meaning? In most cases, they do not. The issue here is more dif­
ficult than with metaphor because of the conceptual contiguity of metonymy 
 (Dirven 1993) which causes metonymy to be defeasible (and thus more likely to 
be  saturated). Whether these utterances have a direct meaning with a stable 
 interpretation or an indirect interpretation resulting from a rejected literal mean­
ing will also vary, at least in part, according to the linguistic properties of the 
 utterance.
2.10 Conclusions
The arguments in this part of the paper problematize current approaches to 
 metaphor by showing that the linguistic structure of metaphoric utterances 
has  a  large influence on whether the metaphor has a direct and consistent 
 meaning or an indirect interpretation dependent on the situation of its use. 
The  first category of  metaphors can be modeled, as in CMT, but the second 
 category cannot (or at least, not in the same way). While the first category is 
the  largest, it is not so large as I, at least, had expected. This leads to an un­
expected critique of approaches to metaphor within cognitive linguistics, that 
they attempt to model what cannot be modeled because it does not properly 
 exist in all situations (e.g., metaphoric meaning). In order to prevent this critique 
from being taken too far, I will now present a new source of evidence that some 
metaphors have the sorts of meanings that are described by work in cognitive 
linguistics.
Why is this necessary when there is already a great deal of processing evi­
dence against the reinterpretation views of Martinich (1984) and Searle (1979), 
for example Coulson and Matlock (2001) and the survey in Evans (2010)? First, 
Davidson’s arguments against the existence of metaphoric meaning do not nec­
essarily require the reinterpretation view. In other words, that view arose in part 
because the position that metaphors are meaningless goes against the common 
use and interpretation of metaphoric expressions, so that some explanation of 
how meaningless utterances come to have meaning was necessary. Second, nei­
ther of these two positions make any testable predictions about processing, in 
their view (unlike the view within cognitive linguistics) a separate issue. Third 
and most importantly, processing is in many ways tangential to the issue, which 
is whether metaphors have a direct meaning with a stable interpretation. Process­
ing does not tell us what the interpretation is. We need a way to show that inter­
pretations are stable; the surest way to do this is to make and test predictions 
about metaphoric meaning.
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3  Falsifiable predictions of the meaning 
of metaphors
3.1  Using forced metaphorization to predict changes 
in utterance meaning
In Popper’s (1959[1934]) view of scientific theories, a true theory must be falsifi­
able. In other words, the constructs required for a scientific theory cannot them­
selves be individually observed and tested, so the theory as a whole is tested by 
determining what predictions it makes, what its expectations are, and then test­
ing those expectations. This part of the paper presents a methodology for making 
testable predictions about the interpretation of metaphoric utterances. If we can 
make valid predictions about the interpretation of metaphoric utterances then it 
means that those interpretations are relatively stable.9
My argument hinges upon the claim that we can predict what meaning 
change will occur when we force metaphorization upon a non­metaphoric utter­
ance. In other words, we can take a non­metaphoric utterance and substitute into 
it a single lexical item that forces the utterance to become metaphoric. This cre­
ates an unsaturated metaphoric utterance. For each such forced metaphorization 
we are left with a created metaphoric utterance. If we substitute multiple lexical 
items into the original non­metaphoric utterance, then we can compare the mean­
ings of each of the resulting metaphoric utterances. My argument is that we can 
predict whether two substituted lexical items will cause the same or different 
changes in meaning using only their lexicalized meanings (in particular, whether 
they point to the same or different concepts). I am using forced metaphorization 
because it allows us to make testable predictions about what the interpretation of 
the resulting metaphoric utterance will be.
In order for this to work we need to know two things: (i) the lexicalized 
 meaning of each of the substituted lexical items and (ii) the meanings of the 
 created metaphoric utterances. We can use (i) the lexicalized meaning of the lexi­
cal items to predict (ii) whether they will cause the same or different meaning 
changes in the metaphorized utterance. We can make these predictions because 
9 To reformulate this in the terms used by Kértesz and Rákosi (2009), the failure to falsify 
these predictions will lead to a plausible inference that these metaphoric utterances have a 
stable, direct meaning. At the same time, negative falsification evidence is stronger than 
positive plausible inferences, although it does require its own plausible inferences involving 
(i) what the predictions of the model actually are and (ii) what sources of evidence and what 
cases count as falsifying.
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these sorts of metaphors (low metaphoricity and unsaturated) have a stable 
 interpretation.
There are two matters that we must consider before we can make such predic­
tions about the interpretation of metaphoric utterances: (1) different ways that 
meaning is lexicalized (so that we know when lexical items point to the same or 
different concepts); and (2) ways to determine what changes in meaning result 
from forced metaphorization.
3.1.1 Semantics and pragmatics, propositional and non-propositional meaning
The constructs of propositional and non­propositional meaning are problematic 
because their definitions often rest on the non­existing distinction between se­
mantic and pragmatic meaning. There are many different approaches to mean­
ing, but through them all there remains the observation that some sorts of mean­
ing are more important, more essential, more stable than other sorts of meaning. 
The term “propositional” refers directly to the logical formalism used for repre­
senting the sense or intension of an utterance in formal semantics. The narrow 
use of the term includes only declarative statements that have a truth­value. 
The  broader use of the term, however, includes all stable or essential or non­ 
defeasible linguistic sources of meaning. For those who adhere to Davidson’s 
 position on metaphor, metaphoric meaning is non­propositional (in the narrow 
sense) because metaphors are literally false or absurd (and thus incapable of be­
ing false). I have argued above that this view of metaphoric meaning is incorrect 
for most metaphoric utterances. Thus, although I think that the term “proposi­
tional meaning” in the broad sense provides a useful distinction, I will choose a 
different set of terms to make the distinction between non­defeasible, essential, 
direct meaning and defeasible, descriptive, secondary meaning. (I am excluding 
connotations or heteroglossia effects (Bakhtin 1994 [1930s]) from this discussion 
entirely.) In what follows, I will refer these two different sorts of meaning using 
the terms “essential meaning” and “non­essential meaning.” This distinction 
does not depend on the difference between semantic or pragmatic meaning. 
While it remains problematic, no unproblematic alternative is available.
3.2 Lexicalized meaning
Research on lexicalization has shown that any semantic property of an utterance 
(i.e., any part of the utterance meaning) can be expressed in the explicit linguistic 
structure or can be expressed internally within a single lexical item. In other 
words, there is a continuum between grammar and the lexicon (with no discrete 
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boundaries between them) and both points of this continuum can be used to ex­
press meaning. Lexicalization in this context refers to the inclusion of meaning in 
a lexical item. For this study I draw from the tradition of ontological semantics 
(Nirenburg and Raskin 2004; henceforth OnSe), which represents lexical mean­
ing by separating concepts and the lexical items which (a) point to concepts and 
(b) lexicalize additional properties while pointing to concepts.10 Thus, many lexi­
cal items point to a particular concept and may or may not lexicalize (or include) 
properties of that concept. At the same time, many lexical items do not point to 
any concept and simply lexicalize properties of another concept (i.e., there is not 
a one­to­one mapping between concepts and lexical items in either direction). To 
look at a simple example, (26a) makes grammatically overt the fact that the in­
strument for the motion is a bicycle, while (26b) lexicalizes both the motion­event 
itself and the instrument involved in a single verb. Both have the same utterance 
meaning.11 I want to illustrate the relationship between concepts and lexical 
items by looking at two different semantic phenomena: parametric verbs and dis­
placed modifiers (Nirenburg and Raskin 2004).
(26a)  I rode to the store on a bicycle.
(26b)  I bicycled to the store.
Parametric verbs (such as expect, try,  fail, hope, and  fear) are syntactic verbs 
which do not represent events. Thus, these lexical items do not point to a particu­
lar concept but rather modify an already instantiated concept elsewhere. Para­
metric verbs often add a modality or aspect to a different verb in the sentence. The 
point here is that these syntactic main verbs do not contain or even modify the 
event itself, but rather express the speaker’s perception of the event. Let’s look 
at  some examples. In (27a) the main syntactic verb is expect, but the event is 
 contained in the noun gains. This can be paraphrased as (27b). The example is 
especially interesting because of the disconnect between syntactic structure and 
utterance meaning.
10 This is similar to the position in LCCM theory (Evans 2010) which divides its representation 
of conceptual structure (in OnSe, the ontology) and semantic structure (in OnSe, the lexicon), 
with the result that many open-class lexical items have access to multiple areas of the 
conceptual system. Research in the OnSe paradigm has pointed out the practical difficulty of 
separating which of these two resources should store or describe a particular piece of content 
(is it linguistic or conceptual; Nirenburg and Raskin 2001)? Their answer is practical: it is a 
matter of engineering standards. This is required, of course, because OnSe has been 
implemented with full coverage, rather than with toy models and example content.
11 They do, however, provide a different prominence to the elements (e.g., [9a] focuses on the 
bicycle) which in many discourse contexts may have further implications.
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(27a)  You should expect some gains from bonds moving forward.
(27b)  Bonds may increase moving forward. You should think this is likely.
In (28a) the status of try is again not an event in itself but rather a modifica­
tion of the event pointed to by continue. In (28b) the utterance meaning changes 
so that the action is carried out rather than simply attempted: they do continue 
their tactics. Thus, try represents a modality expressing someone’s perceptions of 
the event’s success or failure.
(28a)  That could embolden politicians to try to continue their delaying tactics.
(28b)  That could embolden politicians to continue their delaying tactics.
Displaced modifiers are adjectives that do not modify the phrase they are syn­
tactically apart of. These are like parametric verbs in the sense that they modify 
another element in the utterance rather than their syntactic heads in the surface 
structure. In (29a) occasional again modifies the utterance meaning in terms of its 
aspect: the whole utterance meaning occurs repeatedly but infrequently. In (29b), 
though, the adjective modifies only the concept lizard itself.
(29a)  The occasional lizard would rustle in the bushes.
(29b)  The skink lizard would rustle in the bushes.
The same generalizations hold true for former in (30a): this does not change 
anything about the vice­chairman, rather saying that he is no longer in that posi­
tion. By contrast, in (30b) the modifier most corrupt does modify the attributes of 
the chairman.
(30a)  Miller is the former Chase vice-chairman.
(30b)  Miller is the most corrupt Chase vice-chairman.
One piece of evidence for this brief analysis is that we can find minimal pairs 
for lexical items that point to the same concept while lexicalizing different prop­
erties of that concept. Examples (31a) and (31b) show a minimal pair for dis­
tance: (a) is longer in distance than (b) but all other specifications are the same. 
In (32a) and (32b) the motion is the same but the modality applied to that motion 
changes: one is allowed and the other is not. In (33a) and (33b) the motion differs 
only in velocity: one is slow and the other is fast. In (34a) and (34b) the motion 
differs only in the direction taken, one upward and the other downward. In (35a) 
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and (35b) the motion differs only in the level of secrecy: the first is fully visible but 
the second is done covertly.
(31a) The girl leapt across the hole.
(31b) The girl hopped across the hole.
(32a) The prisoner exited  from her cell.
(32b) The prisoner escaped  from her cell.
(33a) The children walked home.
(33b) The children ran home.
(34a) The expedition ascended the mountain.
(34b) The expedition descended the mountain.
(35a) The neighbor walked through the backyard.
(35b) The neighbor stole through the backyard.
To conclude, I want to list the ways in which two lexical items can differ. Each 
of these different relationships between a lexical item and a concept can play a 
role in forced metaphorization, as we will see shortly.12
– They can point to different concepts.
– They can point to different instances of the same concept.
– One can point to a concept and the other can point to no concept.13
– They can point to the same concept but lexicalize different properties.
– They can modify entirely different parts of the utterance meaning 
(e.g., occasional vs. skink in (29) above).
– They can point to overlapping but not identical association areas.14
12 In OnSe, different senses of a lexical item often point to different concepts; the list here 
assumes that the sense of the lexical item has been disambiguated so that only one concept is 
pointed to. In LCCM, a lexical concept is connected to or facilitates access to the conceptual 
structure. Although the lexical concept can facilitate access to a many different association 
areas, during interpretation that semantic potential is not fully activated. In other words, the 
list here can be formulated as the relationship between a lexical concept (after lexical concept 
selection) and the conceptual content to which it provides access or activates in a particular 
utterance (i.e., under a particular interpretation), even though the lexical concept would have 
different relationships with the conceptual content in other uses (i.e., under another 
interpretation).
13 Lexical items which point to no concept or point to a concept with certain properties show 
that there is a continuum between lexical and grammatical words. I am being explicit here 
because many lexical words exhibit properties of grammatical words, and this terminology is 
necessary before the predictions can be formulated.
14 This last point is true in LLCM but not in OnSe. In descriptive terms (i.e., how to represent a 
particular semantic phenomenon) these cases are represented using lexicalized properties and 
attributes in OnSe (a less cognitively real but more implementable approach).
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3.3  Observing changes in utterance meaning
When we try to force metaphorization by substituting a lexical item into a non­
metaphoric utterance three distinct outcomes occur:
i. the utterances have equivalent essential or non­essential meanings
ii. the utterances have different essential or non­essential meanings
iii. no interpretation is possible
When no interpretation is possible there are two reasons: (a) metaphoriza­
tion has been blocked by external factors (for example, one of the utterances is 
conventional or idiomatic, or the substituted word does not fit into the original 
utterance’s construction frame); (b) no metaphoric interpretation is possible. For 
(b) it is interesting to ask what constraints exist on possible metaphors and what 
the nature of those constraints are. Approaches to metaphor within cognitive lin­
guistics predict that such constraints will exist; the existence of these constraints 
is a further argument against Davidson’s position, to the extent that they are 
 operative. At the same time, the constraints are somewhat problematic. For ex­
ample, Barnden (2010) questions the domain approach to metaphors because 
it  seems that metaphoric connections can be made between concepts within a 
single domain. In other words, it is not clear how similar two concepts can be and 
still be able to be metaphorically connected: perhaps metaphor does not require 
any domain separation. This is especially problematic when trying to separate 
metaphoric and metonymic utterances. In some cases, forced metaphorization 
results in the creation of a metonymic utterance rather than a metaphoric utter­
ance. We can avoid this complication by choosing to substitute lexical items that 
create metaphoric expressions.
When forced metaphorization is possible there are two levels of meaning 
change: on the one hand, some express the same essential meaning (but with a 
difference in meaning somewhere else), and on the other hand some express dif­
ferent essential meanings. We can test for equivalence of this sort of meaning by 
finding a strong implication that differs from one version to another. A strong 
implication is not strictly speaking an entailment; rather, it is an implication that 
is not easily canceled (non­defeasible). In other words, if substitution changes 
one of these strong implications then we know that the essential meaning has 
also changed. Example (36a) has the strong implication given in (36b). Examples 
(36c) and (36d) have the same strong implication and thus express the same es­
sential meaning.
(36a)  Stocks tumbled on the final day of the week.
(36b)  Strong Implication: Stocks are lower now than they were before.
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(36c)  Stocks dived on the final day of the week.
(36d)  Stocks plummeted on the final day of the week.
Let’s look at some substitutions which do not have the same essential mean­
ing. Example (37a) has the strong implication given in (37b). This example does 
not indicate substantial change upward or downward, but rather strongly implies 
that, despite minor changes, stocks have remained at the same general level. The 
substitution in (37c) shares this strong implication, but the substitution in (37d) 
does not and thus has a different essential meaning.
(37a)  Stocks ambled on the final day of the week.
(37b)  Strong Implication: Stocks may or may not be lower now than they were 
 before.
(37c)  Stocks drifted on the final day of the week.
(37d)  Stocks sky-rocketed on the final day of the week.
Example (38a) has the strong implication in (38b.a) and the weak implication 
in (38b.b). I am distinguishing strong implications and weak implications here 
by  the use of the negation test. In other words, (38b.a′) is unacceptable, but 
(38b.b′) is possible. Thus, the use of dive in requires that congress debated and 
was involved in the issue, but the choice could simply be that congress can no 
longer avoid the issue and so wishes to get through it as quickly as possible. 
The substitutions in (38c) through (38e) carry with them the same strong implica­
tions and the same weak implications. The conclusion, then, is that they express 
both the same essential meaning and non­essential meaning. Interestingly, (38c) 
and (38e) add more weak implications without removing the previous weak 
 implication.
(38a)  Congress dived into a controversial topic last tonight.
(38b.a)  Strong Implication: Congress debated and tried to resolve a controversial 
topic.
(38b.a′)  *Congress did not debate or try to resolve the topic, however.
(38b.b)  Weak Implication: Congress is active or purposeful in doing this.
(38b.b′)  Congress is not being courageous: they can’t avoid it any longer.
(38c)  Congress galloped into a controversial topic last tonight.
(38d)  Congress jumped into a controversial topic last tonight.
(38e)  Congress strutted into a controversial topic last tonight.
Let’s look at a series of examples which changes the strong implications. In 
(39a) the use of amble reverses the strong implication to that in (39b.a), as shown 
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by the fact that the negation of the strong implication in (39b.a′) is unacceptable. 
While (39a) weakly implies (39b.b), the negation of the weak implication does not 
produce an unacceptable statement, showing that this is not a strong implication 
as I am using the term. Examples (39c) through (39e) do not change either the 
strong implication or the weak implication of the original metaphor.
(39a)  Congress wandered into a controversial topic last tonight.
(39b.a)  Strong Implication: Congress had not planned this topic in this way.
(39b.a′)  *Congressmen had been preparing their positions for months in advance.
(39b.b)  Weak Implication: Congress is not doing this purposefully, rather 
 accidentally.
(39b.b′)  Congress wants to test the issue before the midterm elections.
(39c)  Congress skidded into a controversial topic last tonight.
(39d)  Congress slipped into a controversial topic last tonight.
(39e)  Congress strayed into a controversial topic last tonight.
It is important to note here that strong and weak implications of this sort are 
not restricted to metaphors and in fact are derived in much the same way in non­
metaphoric utterances. This is important because we will be using strong and 
weak implications to show that the output of forced metaphorization is predict­
able. These implications apply to metaphoric and non­metaphoric utterances in 
the same way because both have a direct meaning.
3.4  Predicting meaning change during forced metaphorization
My claim is that we can make predictions about what meaning change will occur 
during forced metaphorization and that these predictions are evidence for the 
stable interpretation of metaphoric utterances (which are themselves evidence 
for the existence of metaphoric meanings). We can use multiple lexical items as 
substitutes during forced metaphorization and then compare the essential mean­
ing and non­essential meaning of their respective metaphoric utterances to see if 
they are the same or different.
Lexical items often point to concepts. (1) The first prediction is that sub­
stituting lexical items which point to the same concept will cause a similar 
change  in essential meaning during forced metaphorization. (2) The second 
 prediction is  that substituting lexical items which point to the same concept 
but  have diff erent lexicalized properties will have similar changes in essential 
meaning  during forced metaphorization but different changes in non­essential 
meaning. (3) The third prediction is that substituting lexical items which point to 
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different concepts will cause different changes in essential meaning during forced 
metaphorization.
These are not complicated predictions. They do not need to be. They only 
need to be valid to show that metaphors (by which I mean low metaphoricity and 
unsaturated metaphoric utterances) have a stable interpretation. As discussed 
above, we can use strong implications and weak implications to decide whether 
the output of forced metaphorization with two different lexical items have the 
same essential meaning or the same non­essential meaning. Thus, we do not 
need to worry about how to represent the two sorts of meaning for these meta­
phoric utterances. We only need to find out if meaning of two different utterances 
created through forced metaphorization are or are not equivalent.15
3.5  What happens during forced metaphorization
The output of forced metaphorization is a metaphoric interpretation of the utter­
ance meaning as a whole, not necessarily the meaning of the individual lexical 
item that was substituted into the utterance. At the same time, we know that the 
only difference in the utterances are their respective lexical items (the original 
and its substitute). The substituted lexical item itself does not contain a meta­
phoric meaning, as if placing a metaphoric word into an utterance makes the 
whole utterance instantly metaphoric by its mere presence. Rather, the relation 
between the substituted lexical item and the rest of the utterance forces or 
prompts a metaphoric reading. This happens because the constructional context 
(surrounding arguments) “provide the direct link between surface form and gen­
eral aspects of the interpretation” (Goldberg 2009: 95). In other words, the main 
verb (which is what we are substituting here) underspecifies the structure of the 
clause, the construction in which the utterance is presented. Because of this, the 
other arguments have an important role in shaping the construction, not simply 
serving as slots for the substituted verb. It is this interaction between the substi­
tuted verb and the rest of the construction that coerces or shapes the non­ 
metaphoric meaning of the utterance and gives rise to a direct metaphoric inter­
pretation. In short, although prompted by the substitution of a lexical item, 
forced metaphorization affects the utterance as a whole.
15 Non-metaphoric utterances, of course, can have similarly stable meanings and implications 
after substitution in this way. The point here is not that metaphoric utterances differ from 
non-metaphoric utterances in this respect, but rather that they are the same. The fact that they 
have similar properties is because these sorts of metaphors have a direct meaning that is 
stable and consistently interpreted.
Brought to you by | Purdue University Libraries
Authenticated | 128.211.166.235
Download Date | 8/31/13 10:09 PM
Metaphoric meaning   59
We can describe the process in more detail by adopting the framework of 
LCCM theory (Evans 2010). The conception (i.e., utterance­meaning) of the origi­
nal sentence undergoes lexical content selection which disambiguates which 
lexical concepts are involved. These lexical concepts are fused into the final 
meaning by first integrating the lexical contents into a construction and then 
 activating the parts of the conceptual system which they point to or access. The 
activation of the conceptual system is constrained by the relations between the 
lexical concepts, including the matching of the lexical concepts to one another 
based on certain properties (not unlike a nuanced implementation of selectional 
restrictions: Katz and Fodor 1963). In the original non­metaphoric utterance, the 
match will occur within the primary cognitive models and the interpretation will 
be complete. In the metaphoric utterances, the match will not occur here and the 
search will extend to the secondary cognitive models until a match occurs and 
interpretation is possible. Thus, the divergence between the original utterance 
and the metaphorized utterances is at the point of matching the primary cognitive 
models, and the divergence between different metaphorized utterances is at the 
point of searching for a match beyond the primary models. The prediction is that 
lexical content which accesses the same areas of the conceptual structure will 
find a match in the same secondary cognitive model and thus will produce an 
interpretation with the same essential meaning.
3.6  Forced metaphorization with lexical items that point to 
the same concept
The prediction is that if we take a non­metaphoric utterance and force it to be­
come metaphoric by substituting a particular lexical item into the utterance, then 
lexical items which point to the same concept and have similar lexicalized mean­
ings will share the same essential meanings. Let’s look at some examples. The 
original non­metaphoric utterance in (40a) has the verb ignore which points to a 
concept which we can call communication. The substituted verbs in (40b–d) are 
flee, evade, and abandon, all of which point to the concept which we can call 
 motion. Further, each of these substituted verbs lexicalizes similar meaning: the 
motion is away from a particular source with an intention to leave the source 
 behind. Thus, these lexical items point to the same concept with roughly simi­
lar  lexicalized meaning. We can make a strong implication that all three of 
the metaphorized utterances share in (40e), so that they all share the same es­
sential meaning. This also aligns with our intuitions. Thus, the same concept is 
lexicalized in each substituted verb and each metaphoric utterance has a similar 
essential meaning.
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(40a)  Non­metaphoric: Irrational people ignore scientific reasoning.
(40b)  Metaphorized 1: Irrational people flee scientific reasoning.
(40c)  Metaphorized 2: Irrational people evade scientific reasoning.
(40d)  Metaphorized 3: Irrational people abandon scientific reasoning.
(40e)  Strong Implication: Irrational people do not make conclusions based on sci-
entific reasoning.
The non­metaphoric utterance (41a) has the verb made which points to a 
 concept which we can call create. The substituted verbs chased, entered, and 
reached in (41b–d) all share the same concept which we can again call motion, 
and each lexicalizes similar properties of this concept: this movement is towards 
a particular goal and the intention is to reach that goal. We can make a strong 
implication that each of these metaphorized utterances shares in (41e) which re­
inforces our intuitions that each of the metaphorized utterances has the same 
essential meaning. This, again, matches our predictions.
(41a)  Non­metaphoric: China has made a trade agreement with the European 
Union.
(41b)  Metaphorized 1: China has chased a trade agreement with the European 
Union.
(41c)  Metaphorized 2: China has entered a trade agreement with the European 
Union.
(41d)  Metaphorized 3: China has reached a trade agreement with the European 
Union.
(41e)  Strong Implication: China and the European Union now have a trade agree-
ment with one another.
3.7  Forced metaphorization with lexical items that point to 
the same concept with different lexicalized meanings
The prediction is that if we take a non­metaphoric utterance and force it to be­
come metaphoric by substituting a particular lexical item into the utterance, then 
lexical items which point to the same concept but have different lexicalized 
 meanings will share the same essential meanings but differ in their non­essential 
meanings. Let’s look at some examples. In (42b–d) the substituted lexical items 
meandered, sauntered, and struggled all point to the same concept of motion, but 
each lexicalizes a different meaning. Meandered lexicalizes the lack of a specific 
destination and the slow speed of the movement. Sauntered lexicalizes the man­
ner of the movement, a slow and assured manner, and does not specify the desti­
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nation or lack of destination. Struggled lexicalizes the difficult manner of the 
 motion, that it is somehow impeded. Each of these shares the strong implication 
in (42e), which corresponds with our intuitions that they have the same essential 
meaning. However, they do not share the same weak implications which means 
that they do not share the same non­essential meaning. The use of meandered in 
(42b) has the weak implication that Jason does not have a fixed point, that he is 
wandering in his speech. The use of sauntered in (42c) has the weak implication 
that Jason is speaking slowly but with a certain amount of self­assuredness. The 
use of struggled in (42d) has the weak implication that Jason’s voice or his speech 
is having trouble being understood. The fact that each of these metaphorized ut­
terances has a different implication is evidence that they do not share the same 
non­essential meaning. This matches our prediction because we expect that dif­
ferent lexicalized meanings pointing to the same concept will differ in this way.
(42a)  Non­metaphoric: Jason’s voice sounded over the telephone line.
(42b)  Metaphorized 1: Jason’s voice meandered over the telephone line.
(42c)  Metaphorized 2: Jason’s voice sauntered over the telephone line.
(42d)  Metaphorized 3: Jason’s voice struggled over the telephone line.
(42e)  Strong Implication: Jason’s voice could be heard through the telephone.
The three substituted verbs in (43b–d) are stampeded, wandered, and crawled 
which again all share the same concept (motion) but differ in the lexicalized 
meaning which they add to that concept. All three metaphorized utterances share 
the strong implication in (43e), which corresponds with our intuitions that they 
share the same essential meaning. Each, however, has a different weak implica­
tion. Stampeded lexicalizes the manner of the motion, that it occurs forcefully, as 
a mass. The weak implication in this utterance is that these investors were not 
necessarily welcome but beat back opposition. Wandered lexicalizes that there is 
no specific destination for this motion. The weak implication in this utterance is 
that these investors do not have a clear plan for their involvement and did not all 
invest at the same time or at the same pace. Crawled lexicalizes the manner of 
motion and, as a result, its speed: slow. The weak implication in this utterance 
is that the investors moved slowly and carefully as they entered these markets. 
Thus, again, these lexical items point to the same concept but have different lexi­
calized meanings and, during forced metaphorization, they produce a similar 
change in essential meaning but have different changes in non­essential mean­
ing. This matches our earlier predictions.
(43a)  Non­metaphoric: They bought into emerging markets when interest rates 
were low.
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(43b)  Metaphorized 1: They stampeded into emerging markets when interest rates 
were low.
(43c)  Metaphorized 2: They wandered into emerging markets when interest rates 
were low.
(43d)  Metaphorized 3: They crawled into emerging markets when interest rates 
were low.
(43e)  Strong Implication: They are now invested in these emerging markets.
3.8  Forced metaphorization with lexical items that point to 
different concepts
The prediction is that if we take a non­metaphoric utterance and force it to be­
come metaphoric by substituting a particular lexical item into the utterance, then 
lexical items which point to the different concepts will have different essential 
and non­essential meanings. Let’s look at some examples. The three substituted 
verbs in (44b–d) point to different concepts. Invade points to the concept motion 
and lexicalizes that this motion is a sort of entering with a hostile intent and for 
the purpose of conquering. This utterance strongly implies that members of con­
gress have entered Mexico and weakly implies that they are not welcome or that 
their intent is malicious. Brandished points to the concept hold and lexicalizes 
that what is held is possibly a weapon that is being waved about in a threaten­
ing manner. This utterance strongly implies that members of congress are using 
Mexico for some sort of purpose during a fact­finding mission. It weakly implies 
that their use of Mexico is threatening in some way, or for dramatic display. Lam-
pooned points to the concept communication and lexicalizes that the communi­
cation is intended to criticize or satirize a particular target. This utterance strong­
ly implies that members of congress criticized Mexico in some way on this 
mission. It weakly implies that they did so in an unbecoming manner. Thus, we 
see that using lexical items that point to different concepts causes differences in 
essential meaning and non­essential meaning. This matches our predictions.
(44a)  Non­metaphoric: Members of congress entered Mexico while on a fact- 
finding mission.
(44b)  Metaphorized 1: Members of congress invaded Mexico while on a fact-
finding mission.
(44c)  Metaphorized 2: Members of congress brandished Mexico while on a fact-
finding mission.
(44d)  Metaphorized 3: Members of congress lampooned Mexico while on a fact-
finding mission.
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The three substituted lexical items in (45b–d) again point to different con­
cepts. Hijacked points, perhaps, to the concept gain control and lexicalizes that 
such control is opposed and that it is gained by using illegitimate means. This 
utterance strongly implies that the secret papers have gained control over the in­
ternet in some way. The weak implication is that this control is not beneficial, that 
the papers are diverting attention from other matters. Ignited points to the con­
cept burn and lexicalizes that the agent is causing something to burn. The strong 
implication in this utterance is that the secret papers have become spread all over 
the internet. The weak implication is that the reaction of those who use the inter­
net to these papers is furious opposition or disgust. Resurrected points to the con­
cept live and lexicalizes that the agent is causing the theme to come to life again. 
The strong implication here is that the internet was reenergized by the release of 
the secret papers. The weak implication is that the internet was in some way di­
minishing before this happened. So, again, these lexical items point to different 
concepts and thus the metaphoric utterances they create have different essential 
meanings.
(45a)  Non­metaphoric: The secret papers slowly entered the internet.
(45b)  Metaphorized 1: The secret papers slowly hijacked the internet.
(45c)  Metaphorized 2: The secret papers slowly ignited the internet.
(45d)  Metaphorized 3: The secret papers slowly resurrected the internet.
3.9 Conclusions
The testable predictions made about the interpretations of metaphoric utter­
ances, which adhere to the highest standard of falsifiability, were not falsified. 
The predictions matched the actual interpretations of metaphoric utterances. 
This fact results in a plausible inference that these metaphoric utterances have 
a stable interpretation. I have argued in Section 2 that some, but not all, meta­
phoric utterances have a direct meaning. The stable interpretations shown in 
 Section 3 are evidence for this direct meaning. This is significant for three rea­
sons: First, it provides a new source of evidence that largely converges with 
 prior  evidence from within the cognitive linguistics paradigm. In this sense it 
strengthens the cognitive linguistic position. Second, it adds nuances to that 
 position: the linguistic structure of the metaphoric utterance influences the in­
terpretability of that utterance. In this sense it expands the cognitive linguistic 
position from metaphor­in­thought to metaphor­in­language. Third, it opens the 
possibility of reconciling approaches to metaphor within cognitive linguistics 
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with those in formal semantics and, possibly, relevance theory. If linguistic (and 
other) properties can be used to divide metaphors into a number of sub­groups, 
then the scope of different approaches to metaphor can be tied directly to a par­
ticular sub­group. Davidson is right about some metaphors; cognitive linguistics 
is right about some metaphors. This enhances the descriptive coverage of meta­
phor as a whole while also working toward the larger reconciliation of different 
approaches to meaning in language (a goal whose benefits I take as self­evident).
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